GENERAL INTRODUCTION

NATARAJA GURU

ETHICS concerns good behaviour. Beside oneself, there is the I other man who is also involved in the same picture. One is asked to be good to oneself and to somebody else at one and the same time. This is the dialectical basis of all ethics. Sometimes this other man or woman involved in one's ethics could be a father, a mother or a wife, or all of humanity treated as brothers in the eye of God. One is called upon to behave rightly towards his religion, or even towards the State treated as a personification either legal, moral or spiritual according to the intensity or seriousness of the relationship within a utilitarian or idealistic frame of reference. The welfare state calls for its own particular code of ethics or morals, while monarchical loyalties could attain to fanatic fervour.

To bring this subject into the scope of a universal and most generalized outlook from a global standpoint, the first desideratum of good ethics would be the breaking through of parochial or closed, cribbed and confined limitations or stultifying frontiers which, through egocentricity, persons or groups of persons are likely to create between themselves and the other man whom we have tried to distinguish above. Duality in interests between oneself and the other man is the fecund cause of all violations of ethics. Good ethics therefore consists in a way of life in which oneself and the other man, thus understood as dialectical counterparts, are made to belong together to a unified or unitive context in such a way that conflict between them would become impossible. It is a unilateral or horizontal treatment of counterparts that can spell disasters big or small, in life, thus tending to shock rudely the norm of all ethics, which is the Absolute Self, common to the two abstracted and generalized personalities to be first distinguished for any systematic principles of ethics to be developed in the interests of both of them at once. In other words, unilateral ethics spells disaster, and unitive ethics is the only ethics worth the name.

The mother tells the child to be good, but the child cannot visualize clearly what the mother means by "good." In the church, the mother herself hears the same talk of goodness that she cannot understand either, with the added prospect of going to heaven dangled before her eyes. Torrents of human tears have drenched the soil from the eyes of children both at home and in the classroom, as well as in the Sunday school, for which no one is responsible - especially not the child. The responsibility is rather to be located with the large number of ethical theories presented to a confused humanity ever since such a subject began to be formulated in the various textbooks of the world.

We learn in college textbooks of Platonic, Nichomachean, Machiavellian and Utilitarian ethical principles, to name but a few, having notions such as "the greatest good of the greatest number," or freedom, as motivating ideals. The "Golden Mean" of Aristotle is a vertical way of life recommended by him. In the world of political ethics, we have a galaxy of other names from Hobbes and Rousseau to Tolstoy, Emerson and Gandhi. The textbooks of ethics such as that of Sedgewick are increasing in size regularly, and new chairs for ethics and religion are being instituted in universities the world over. The ramifications into which this subject has now expanded have become so great that the college student is unable to answer the simplest basic questions on such an important subject teaching the welfare of humanity. This is due to the endless compartmentalization and specialization of disciplines prevalent today, stressing the varieties of a subject rather than its unitive aspects.

India has got here again a vast store-house of wisdom that could help toward the reintegration of such value-based subjects as ethics, aesthetics and education Economics is also of the same group of subjects concerned directly with human values. Sanskrit literature contains valuable hints on how to treat these apparently different academic disciplines under the aegis of one integrating Science of all sciences, having human life significance in the most general of terms.

Go to top

THE NORMATIVE NOTION

Ethics has to have a normative reference in the Self of man. Take away the Self from the total ground of ethics, and what could be imagined as the end result of ethics would at once evaporate and disappear. The benefits of ethics must necessarily have a beneficiary. Putting these two sides together is the secret of the unitive contemplative approach to ethics, so well known to the Upanishadic rishis (seers). As Yajnavalkya puts it in the famous passage from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, "It is not for the sake of the wife that the wife is dear, but for the sake of the Self that she is dear" - and so in every case where two counterparts, one belonging to the Self and the other belonging to the non-Self, are involved. These two sides have to be properly distinguished as the two sides of a reversible equation involved together in the same context of the Absolute Self. To recognize the counterparts properly and to treat them as interacting unitively without horizontal interests creating conflicts is the way of correct ethics, to whatever department it might happen to relate, public or domestic.

What is good for oneself has also to be good for the other man: this is the basic formula to be followed in all ethics, when boiled down to its basic elements. Narayana Guru has put his finger correctly on some of these ethical principles, viewed in terms of such a bipolar dialectical dynamism, in some of the verses of his Atmopadesa Satakam, by quoting which we shall have said what is basically necessary in respect of this very important subject. Our intention in so doing is not to anticipate or prejudice the proceedings of this Conference in any way. We are rather only helping to delimit the scope of the subject so that it could promote that Unitive Understanding which is already the avowed purpose of our meeting here. Such an approach might not seem to have academic dignity, but it surely brings us nearer to a clear view of the problems involved in the subject.


A certain kind is dear, that is dear to me; what is one's own desire
And what is to another, so variously thus puzzlement prevails
Round each object of desire; what to oneself is dear,
That verily know to be another's desire also.

(v. 21)

The other man's interest, that is even mine; what to oneself
Is beneficial is so for the other man also; such is the course of
Discrete conduct. All acts aiming each man's Self-happiness
Must spell at once the happiness of the other fellow-man.

(v. 22)

For the sake of fellow-man, unceasing, day and night,
Unstinting strives the kindly man;
The niggard, lying prone, what frustration's toil undertakes,
That is for his own sake alone.

(v. 23)

What here we view as this man or that,
Reflection reveals to be the Self's prime form;
That conduct adopted for one's Self-happiness,
Another's happiness must also secure at once.

(v. 24)

What spells benefit to one, while to another disaster brings,
Such conduct is one that violates the Self; beware !
That spark of pain intense to another given,
Into inferno's ocean it falls, there to burn in flames. ¹

(v. 25)

Ethics is not to be conceived as depending on the conduct of a good man taken by himself; it is to be understood as a double-edged situation cutting both ways. It has to be conceived not as a lame or one-sided affair, but as a process in which donor and beneficiary belong to a unitive and universal context. Violation of the unitive Self-hood on the one side is equated here (v. 25) with its dialectical counterpart of a general fire of inferno, for which the spark of pain given to a single individual could be the partial stimulus to create a wholesale reaction. Just as intense pain on the tip of one's toe would suffice to upset the balance of the whole person in suffering, so the subtle reciprocity implied here, when the slightest discrimination is made between favourites or enemies, brings unforeseen quantitative or qualitative effects. Consequences flare up into a general conflagration. The sum total of human suffering consists of small sparks of partiality by men somewhere or other at one time or another. The general cause of war should be thought of in this way. Like one spark setting fire to the neighbouring faggot, the continuity of the process of evil effects is to be imagined as operating ceaselessly in the world of human relations. Clashes of clan with clan, time-old feuds, racial, national or other rivalries and preferential pacts, all work together to keep the flames of inferno constantly fed with fuel, and burning incessantly.

When the dualistic attitude has once been abolished and generosity spreads evenly like sunlight without distinction on all human beings, even on the publican ard the sinner, that kind of generosity belongs to the context of the absolutist way of life and is one that, in the context of Self-realization, is very important to keep in mind. The Self can itself become the worst enemy of the Self. This has been brought out with the full force of delicate dialectics in the Bhagavad Gita (VI, 6). ²

In short, one has to learn to live and let live, and to be more concerned in the happiness of the other fellow man, without imposing false frontiers or artificial barriers between man and fellow man. A dynamic, generous and open attitude is to be recommended if frontiers are to be abolished as they must be, and we are to be correctly dedicated to the cause of peace.

REFERENCES

1. Narayana Guru, Atmopadesa Satakam, translated by Nataraja Guru, p.p 108-16 (Gurukula Pub. House, Varkala, 1969).

2. cf. ibid, p. 117.

Go to top

THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF ETHICS

PATRICK MISSON

INTRODUCTION

FROM the time one begins one's life as a boy or girl, or even from the time of infancy, the problem of being good and behaving well is posed constantly. In spite of being told many times a day about being good, neither the elders who ask the children to be good, nor the children themselves, have anything but the vaguest notions as to the content of this strange word. The puzzlement about such a subject, which is no other than what we call ethics, is discussed by such philosophers as Aristotle, Plato, Kant, or Spinoza as also by hundreds of others. There are special chairs in universities where this subject is treated by learned academic authorities; there are retiring professors who have grown grey teaching it throughout their lives. As intellectuals continue grappling with this subject, the textbooks grow fatter, and the definitions which could be gleaned from them are so varied and based upon so many a priori assumptions, that we could safely assert that this is one of the vaguest and most abstruse of subjects treated of in the form of higher studies.

Plato gives us in his philosophy the idea of the Summum Bonum or Supreme Good; all his writings have this idea as their coping stone. It represents the highest goal and hope of humanity. Philosophers make more and more abstract and speculative generalisation about life, and such generalized notions are meant to mark the terminus, goal or end-all of life. Our life consists thus of reaching from the be-all aspects of it to the end-all aspects of the same. This striving marks the limits of the means and the end in the context of purposeful living, in which all spiritual progress consists of reaching towards some kind of perfection.

Perfection is thus a notion which calls for our attention in the context of ethics. When we arrive at such a generalized notion, whether subjectively or objectively conceived, we arrive at the notion of the perfect model of a man, actually living on earth or imagined to be living in the universal elsewhere, whether this is called heaven or paradise. There are perfect men whose perfection might resemble that of their counterparts in heaven, and thus we have two rival notions presenting themselves before us simultaneously. Ethics is concerned with both of these models. The good man could resemble God, and God in his turn could make his perfection understandable to us hereunder by some human attributes. Thus we have two ethical ideals constantly placed before us by moralists or religionists, namely the ideal of a God-like man and that of a man-like God; Here religion enters the domain of ethics and becomes an equal partner in deciding that way of life which is supposed to be right equally in the eyes of religion as well as of morality. The ball of Goodness in the abstract thus is passed from the moralist to the man of religion and vice-versa, and when academic professors also put their hand in the game it is natural to expect that the game might go on forever changing hands between persons who might call themselves authorities on the subject of what is good or beautiful.

One has only to look at the series of fat volumes found in most libraries to have an idea of the extent of the literature available on the subject. College textbooks boil down the topics found in these volumes by professors, junior or emeritus, who start their textbooks derived from such a variety of sources and authorities that the student or the seeker of wisdom stands dazed before the startling array of available teachings. Each philosophy has its own starting premises or postulates. Religions speak, either of a perfect God or of a perfect man, and deal with behaviour patterns pertaining to historic groups or individuals who existed in different ecological regions of the globe. Deserts produce their own religions which tend to be prophetic, while the fertile basins of the Nile or Ganges are known to have customs or manners considered laudable or taboo to various conditions of time or clime. Holy textbooks grow in size to the extent that their compilers keep actively engaged in putting them together. They attain sometimes to an absolutist imperative or an absolute imperativeness for themselves, through themselves or in themselves. Thus it is that ethics becomes inextricably mixed up with the customs of peoples or religious orthodoxies.

This is the complicated picture which ethics presents to us today, resulting from that simple notion with which we started, and which is stated in the phrase "be good" when a mother admonishes a child. It goes without saying that such a vague notion of goodness can hardly influence the modern man, who is at every minute outgrowing his own notions of what is significant in human life. The increasing purpose that is supposed to run through the life of modern man is no longer visible to himself. Man is at present confronted with his own image; the rediscovery of his own nature has to precede any notion of ethics that could be expected to correctly regulate human actions now and for the world of tomorrow.

Go to top

GENERALITIES

To come to closer grips with our subject, let us state initially that the word ethics is derived from Greek ethos (character), and is related to ithos (custom or habit). Thus ethics comprises both subjective and objective values, at the same time, in so far as character applies to the psyche or personality, while custom or habit refers to patterns of behaviour which are necessarily to be viewed with relation to a group of fellow human beings. From family to nation or other tribalistic or racial groups, the possible variations of of such patterns are so kaleidoscopically varied as to be traceable only in their most generalised, abstracted and thus highly cryptic form. If we are to avoid becoming lost in the ramifications of such a subject as ethics, we have therefore to think of it in a highly concentrated form.

Aesthetics, education, economics and ethics, as branches of axiology, are all sister disciplines that belong together, and may even be said to hang together from the same peg. It is significant human life value that is the common characteristic binding together all these disciplines, and Religion, Guruhood, Yoga and even Geo-Politics could also be strung together, as it were, in terms of the same unitive principle of purposefulness in human life. When we add to this that the word "happiness" can be substituted for the one purposeful object of endeavour for which humanity strives, we can easily see that the whole series of subjects depends on a value judgement or notion representing a basic underlying unitive factor. Happiness and High Value are interchangeable terms in the same way that the Good, the True and the Beautiful, goodness, virtue or perfection are interchangeable, when treated sub specie aeternitatis. It is in this sense that Keats wrote "A thing of beauty is a joy forever, its loveliness increases, it will never fade away into nothingness." From the time of the Upanishads which stated categorically that ananda is to be known as the Absolute, through the days of Kalidasa who viewed the philosophy of the Upanishads in the perspective of absolute Beauty, down to the more recent period of Sankara, we have in India a tradition by which all value judgements hang together under such notions as saundarya (beauty) or ananda (happiness or bliss). Sankara has devoted a hundred verses to the subject in his Saundarya Lahari.

Thus, the Unitive Understanding we have to keep in mind when we speak of such subjects requires an integrated basis or norm to serve as a reference. No science can yield any degree of certitude without having a normative notion at its core, however vaguely expressed. It is therefore with such a normative notion in our minds, understood not only theoretically, but with all its structural implications, that we have to delimit the scope of our subject, and clarify our approach to ethics.

Go to top

STRUCTURALISM IMPLICIT IN BERGSON'S ETHICS

To illustrate something of what we have referred to as the structural aspects of ethics, we shall quote from Henri Bergson's The Two Sources of Religion and Morality where the structural nature of our subject is stated clearly, perhaps for the first time. Bergson describes social ethics, or as he terms it, the "ethics of the market place," in structural language: "Society occupies the circumference, the individual is at the centre, from the centre to the circumference are arranged, like so many ever widening circles, the various groups to which the individual belongs. From the circumference to the centre, as the circles grow smaller, obligations are added to obligations, and the individual ends by finding himself confronted with all of them together. Thus obligation increases as it advances, but if it is more complicated, it is less abstract, and the more easily accepted. When it has become fully concrete it coincides with a tendency, so habitual that we find it natural, to play the part which our station assigns to us." ¹ The individual is thus placed in the context of his society by obligations ranging from the most concrete and particular, such as those towards the members of one's family, to the most abstract and general, as those felt towards one's fellow countrymen or towards the state. The first structural feature to be kept in mind is thus a horizontal series of concentric circles representing social obligations.

Man in society by his education, whether implicitly or explicitly, becomes conscious of the sum of the customs or folkways which he assimilates and passes on in his turn to younger members of his society. The sum of these obligations creates the different relationships and interactions which make up the particular society. The nature and the intensity of the obligations of morality or custom are what give the society its character and limits, and serve to perpetuate it. To the extent that obligation extends, so do the limits of the society, and the nature of the obligation to each one of the concentric circles defines the nature of the society. When we consider the society in time, rather than statically, we can consider the manner in which obligations are passed on to succeeding generations, thus perpetuating the society in a relatively changeless form as a horizontal figure of eight, returning continually upon itself.

Thus, obligation in its various forms, of which morality in the strict sense of the word is but a part, is to be seen as the basis of all society. Bergson further contrasts the nature of obligation in human society with that of social insects such as ants or bees: "In the former (a hive or ant-hill), each rule is laid down by nature, and is necessary, whereas in the latter, (human society) only one thing is natural, the existence of a rule." ² Here we can see a further structural feature defining itself. If we consider the horizontal axis as describing the particular obligations of the insect society, by descending below it on the vertical axis we could place human societies, where obligation is more generalised. In an insect society, every pattern of behaviour is rigidly dictated by instinct, and variations are infinitesimal. In human societies the obligation is more general, and the variations in the manner of fulfilling a function such as the procreation and bearing of children are very great, even within one particular society. Bergson writes further: "The deeper we go from particular obligations which are at the top, to obligation in general, which is at the bottom, the more obligation appears as the very form assumed by necessity in the realm of life, when it demands, for the accomplishment of certain ends, intelligence, choice and therefore liberty." ³ Implied here under the term "necessity" we can discern the dynamism which Bergson calls the elan vital or vital impulse, originating at the base of the vertical axis or alpha point, where it is in its most general form, and acquiring greater specificity as it rises to the "O" point or meeting point of the two axes.

It must be emphasized that the sum of obligations that make up a society, which Bergson terms the "Morality of the market place," is essentially closed and static: As Bergson writes: "Our social duties compose for us an attitude which is that of discipline in the face of an enemy." ⁴ And further: "Social obligation always has in view a closed society, however large." It is closed in the sense that it always implies an exclusion. Everyone of the concentric circles mentioned above divides humanity into two, into a "we" and a "they." Even the largest of circles will always have an outside and an inside, and will imply a dualistic approach. It is static in that the horizontal figure of eight dynamism which we have referred to above serves to perpetuate the society and to preserve the relationships implied by obligations. This does not of course mean that societies do not change, but that the education which is passed on from generation to generation will seek to ensure that the individual will behave in a certain way towards, say, his parents, his tribal elders, his tribe's enemies, and that that way will be essentially the same as that of the preceding generation.

If we were to take into account only this horizontal morality of the market place, we would expect the history of morality, and to some extent the history of societies, to present us with a picture of continuity in sameness, or at least with changes so slow as to be almost imperceptible. But such is not the case. In contrast to the horizontal and static morality of the market place, Bergson distinguishes a second kind of morality which he calls the "morality of aspiration" and which transcends the bounds of closed societies: "Exceptional souls have appeared who sensed their kinship with the soul of everyman, who thus, instead of remaining within the limits of the group, and going no farther than the solidarity laid down by nature, were borne upon a great surge of love towards humanity in general. The appearance of each one of them was like the creation of a new species, composed of one single individual, the vital impulse culminating at long intervals in one particular man, a result which could not have been attained at one stroke by humanity as a whole. Each of these souls marked then a certain point attained by the evolution of life; and each one of them was a manifestation in an original form, of a love which seems to be the very essence of the creative effort (elan vital)." ⁶ Further on he writes: "'Social pressure' and 'impetus of love' are but two complementary manifestations of life, normally intent on preserving generally the social form which was characteristic of the human species from the beginning, but exceptionally capable of transfiguring it, thanks to individuals who each represent, as the appearance of a new species would have represented, an effort of creative evolution." ⁷ Thus, these great souls or teachers of humanity draw up from the very source of obligation itself (what we would represent by the alpha point) a new moral force which attracts humanity upward towards the teacher who is placed as the example or object of aspiration at the omega point or positive limit of the vertical axis. This dynamism is a manifestation of the vital impulse fundamental to Bergson's philosophy. It is to be noted that this force moving upward is can-celled by an equal and opposite downward motion which we could illustrate by the example of what happens to the teaching when it is recognized and taken over by society and becomes in its turn the morality of the market place, closed, static and dualistically opposed to other beliefs and faiths, as has been the case with the established religions with which we are familiar. When the teacher appears and there is an upward surge of the morality of aspiration, the horizontal morality contracts and is absorbed into the vertical. As the impetus of the vertical decreases, the horizontal again asserts itself and expands. We could thus discern an alternating inverse proportionality between the two axes. We can note that Bergson's emphasis on the personality of the teacher and the vertical bipolar relationship involved in the morality of aspiration conform to the importance given on Indian soil to the Guru-disciple relationship, considered as essential for spiritual progress to take place.

By these short remarks on Bergson's theory of ethics, we hope to have given at least some idea of the structural frame of reference as applied to ethics, and we propose now to attempt to demonstrate how, when we are approaching different theories of ethics, we can relate them one to another by referring them to a central normative notion.

Go to top

A NORMATIVE NOTION FOR ETHICS

We propose as such a norm the definition of ethics given by Narayana Guru in his Atmopadesa Satakam, verse 22:

The other man's interest, that is even mine; what to oneself
Is beneficial is so for the other man also; such is the course of
Discrete conduct. All acts aiming each man's self happiness
Must spell at once the happiness of the other fellow man. ⁸

Here the Self and non-Self aspects of ethics are cancelled without emphasis or partiality given to one or other side of the dialectical situation. The happiness of every individual having its counterpart in the happiness of all individuals. Such a notion might be seen to emphasize unduly neither teleological nor ontological factors, but to represent the "O" point of cancellation as between them.

All systems of ethics which cannot be located at this central norm can be seen as diverging from it in one direction or another, towards a one-sided approach. We could oppose an "epicurean" ethic, which emphasizes subjective factors of happiness, to a materialistic or Marxist one, which would stress the good of the society rather than that of the individual. We could distinguish a prophetic religious ethic founded upon teleological considerations of faith or belief, as against a pagan ontological context where custom or ritual is more important. A circulation in time can be discerned between these two poles when we study the history of ethics in a given social group. A custom such as the non-killing of livestock at the season of giving birth as amongst the Semitic nomads can become a moral injunction as in the Jewish rule against seething a kid in its mother's milk, or in the Muslim fast of Ramadan.

Ethics which derive the force of their obligations from religious orthodoxies, either in the form of commandments dictated by a godhead "up there," or from the force of tradition and ritual, cannot be valid for the whole of mankind, for they imply, in Bergson's terms, "a closed group, however large." In the Indian context, where prophetic and pagan elements exist side by side in Islam and Hinduism, we can see this fact adequately illustrated. Belief or otherwise in the veracity of revelation, or the participation in a body of customs and taboos, defines the limits of the acceptance of their moral codes. Tracing each one back to its historical origins, and seeing each one as the product of, or at least as inseparable from, economic, geographic or social elements, and further observing how a similar context will produce a similar ethic, cannot but lead us to consider the claims of two such orthodoxies as arbitrary in the light of scientific inquiry. However, when we propose the verse of Narayana Guru quoted above as the foundation upon which a unitive ethics could be established, orthodoxy or belief are not called into question, and all religious or philosophical beliefs could co-exist under its aegis. High Value alone, whether called Truth, Beauty or the end of all men's desires, is the source of an ethics valid for all men. It does not inquire whether a man turns one way or another to pray, or whether he pours water on his head or not, or whether God is one or many, but only whether he seeks happiness and recognizes his own as inseparable from that of all other men.

Go to top

COMPLEMENTARITY OF TAOIST AND KANTIAN ETHICS

One of the predominant ideologies of China has been Taoism, or the Doctrine of the Way. Although it has ulteriorly suffered many transformations towards alchemy and extreme forms of superstition or sorcery, the seminal and purest form is to be found in the Tao Te King, ascribed to the "Old Master" or Lao Tse. From this work are derived not only ethical but aesthetic and politico-economic theories of great influence on Chinese thought. We shall now quote briefly from it:

The best of men is like water...which dwells in lowly places
that all disdain, wherein it comes near the Tao .

Stretch a bow to the very full, and you will wish you had stopped in time;
temper a sword edge to its very sharpest, and the edge will not last long,...
retire when your work is done, such is heaven's way.

Attain to the utmost in passivity, hold firm to the basis in quietude,
banish wisdom, discard knowledge, and the people shall profit a hundredfold.

The thing that is called Tao is evasive, elusive, ..dark and dim.
To yield is to be preserved whole, to be bent is to become straight, hollow is to be filled,
to be tattered is to be renewed, to be in want is to possess, to have plenty is to be confused.

He who stands on tiptoe does not stand firm, he who strains his stride does not walk well.
Heaven models itself on Tao, Tao models itself on nature.
He who is aware of the male, but keeps to the female, he becomes the ravine of the world.
He (the sage) returns to the state of uncarved wood. Tao is absolute and has no name;
though the uncarved wood is small, it cannot be, employed by anyone

Gentleness overcomes strength, fish should be left in the deep pool,
and sharp weapons should be left where none can see them.
The softest substance in the world goes through the hardest,
that which is without form penetrates, that which has no crevice." ⁹

The ideal or norm of conduct, represented by the "wise man", could thus be seen as being in accord with Tao. Tao is an a priori absolute which is described in terms of concrete ontological reality, by analogy or metaphor. The qualities attributed to it could be described as negative rather than positive. Fluidity and passivity are stressed as against rigidity or activity. When asked to explain the Tao, an old sage would reply by opening his toothless mouth, wiggling his tongue, and saying "The-hard and rigid, wears away, the soft and pliant stays." It can also be noted that the Tao Te King expresses itself in an intuitive and poetic language of simile and allusion where logic, deductive or inductive, plays no part. This could also be described as negative. Thus, by this emphasis on ontology, intuitive values and natural analogies, the ethical value as described in the Tao Te King is negative. By its a priori or absolute nature, being in itself, for itself, by itself, it can be seen as belonging to the vertical negative pole, The dialectical nature of the Absolute is. recognized in the very first verse: "The nameless is the origin of heaven and earth, the named is the mother of all things," providing a pair of counterparts cancellable into the natural notion of the Absolute.

To emphasize this evaluation of Taoism as negative in character, we shall consider a theory of ethics which could be considered as its counterpart at the positive pole of the vertical axis. Immanuel Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals could be a good example of an idealist approach. We shall quote briefly from this work to support this: "Power, riches, honour even...happiness inspire pride and often presumption if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind...a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of being even worthy of happiness." Thence Kant defines good will as that which is in accord with duty: "He should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty, and by this would his conduct first acquire moral worth." Thus, by generalising the particular case of conflict of duties, Kant considers all moral obligation as effort, as though it were in some way contrary to our natural inclinations. This could be perhaps related to the Protestant intellectual context in which Kant lived. The second proposition, the first is included in the previous quotation) is that an action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the purpose which is to be attained by it but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire." Further on he writes: "The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two preceding, I would express thus, duty is the necessity of acting from respect of the law. I may have inclination for an object and the effect of my proposed action, but I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will." He continues: "Nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations." Again we see the emphasis on effort and going against one's nature, rather than on morality as a harmonious cancellation of counterparts. "There remains nothing but the universal conformity of its (the will's) actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle: i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law." Here Kant is presenting the Categorical Imperative, which is the form taken by the absolute norm in his thinking. He defines it as "that which represents an action as necessary of itself, without reference to another end, i. e., as objectively necessary." He has stated earlier that "It is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that moreover in the commonest reason, just as truly as that which is in the highest degree speculative, that they cannot be derived by abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent knowledge:" ¹¹

Now it is true that Kant has established that moral conduct is in accord with reason, but when we consider whether it is in fact derived from reason, as he states, we must qualify the notion of reason, as it is usually understood. We take reason in the usual sense, then we must realize that by itself it is not a sufficient basis upon which to establish morality. We would either have to equate this mere logical coherence with moral obligation, which would be erroneous, or else consider it as a logical invitation to pursue an end established by elements extraneous to it. When Kant says in a passage subsequent to those which we have just quoted that a deposit of money must be returned to the depositor, or it would no longer be a deposit, it would be only mere playing with words. This statement could mean only one of two things. One possibility is that the deposit merely constitutes the material fact of placing money with someone, with the understanding that it should be returned. This in itself however does not necessarily involve moral obligation; the money could equally be returned or not, if we limit ourselves to logical reasoning alone. Another possibility would be that moral factors are to be added to reason in its limited meaning, concepts such as "trust" or of a contract which must be honoured being implicitly included in the act of making the deposit. In this case only would not returning the deposit involve a contradiction. But this entails adding to the concept of "deposit" associated ideas of moral obligation not originally present. We must understand that pure reason for Kant is a term which contains both positive or rational elements as well as negative factors such as intuition, cancelled into the neutral Absolue.

From this we can see how the imposing structures of reasoning erected by philosophers cannot on their own be sufficient for an ethical philosophy. There is a cancellation which must exist between both ontological and teleological counterparts, giving recognition to their equality of status. Kant could be seen to consider the ding an sich or thing in itself as being distinct from purely ideal entities, and by such notions as the "transcendental aesthetic" recognizes the negative counterpart of the situation. Thus it can be seen that Kant avoids the unilateral error which would attend an extreme rationalistic or idealistic approach.

Kant and the Taoist philosophy of the Tao Teh King could therefore be seen as dialectical counterparts. Both recognize a normative neutral Absolute, in one case the Tao, in the other the Categorical Imperative. The methods used to arrive at these, notions and the terms in which they are described could hardly be more different, but a dialectical or unitive approach would recognize the validity of both and the complementary nature of two such different approaches.

Go to top

HORIZONTAL ORIENTATION OF HOBBES' ETHICS

In contrast to this, we can turn to an attempt to define and exemplify what we could describe as a horizontal theory of ethics. It can be noted that; whereas in a vertical theory the positive and negative counterparts are cancelled or resolved unitively in terms of an absolute norm, for itself, by itself and in itself, to which all else is relative; in a horizontal approach the duality is not resolved, and an absolute norm of reference is not recognized.

To illustrate our point, we shall quote from Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, which might clarify this fundamental distinction: "Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body and mind, as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another man may not pretend as well as he... From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies ... In the nature of man we find three principle causes of quarrel, first competition, secondly diffidence, thirdly glory... Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition called war... For war consisteth not in battle only, or in the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known... To this war of everyman against everyman, this is also consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where there is no law, there is no justice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor of the mind; if they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and his passions."

From here, Hobbes continues to define certain basic terms used in ethics; "The right of nature, which writers commonly call Jus Naturae, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature: that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto. By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him." ¹² Then Hobbes goes on to define what he calls "natural laws:" "Firstly, that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hopes of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, he may seek and use all the helps and advantages of war." Secondly, "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as for both, as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things: and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself." ¹³

Hobbes is expounding here a socially derived theory of ethics. His conception of morality is based entirely upon a posteriori and pragmatic considerations. He conceives of moral laws as operating horizontally like a pair of scales, establishing an equilibrium of mutual convenience between men. They are confined to such limited applications as the preservation of life and property and establishing social harmony, and do not refer to any vertical norm or value. In his perspective, man is a social animal whose conduct is relevant only in relation to that of other men. Right and wrong are not a priori, but are based upon a contract between men agreeing to limit their natural ferocity in order to permit them to function in society. Man outside society, to which he seems to assimilate primitive peoples, is considered as a natural predator upon other men without morality at all. Reciprocity, in the form "do as you would be done by," is the most exalted moral principle he recognizes.

We have here, again, a theory of ethics which is in itself coherent, but which leaves many important questions unsolved or not dealt with. For Hobbes, moral value only pertains to such actions as involve other men, directly or indirectly, but it is clear that this only covers a part of men's actions, and by limiting the scope of his theory of ethics to such factors alone, he is treating ethics and the value involved in ethics as something relative to other considerations, that is, those of social utility. Moral conduct is not for him an imperative, valid in, for and through itself; it is not of absolute value. Duality is not cancelled but retained, the opposition between one man's interest and that of another is not resolved with reference to a unitive absolute value.

These characteristics could be seen as common to all theories of ethics which we could call horizontal. Further distinctions could be made between such theories, as for example when treating Marxist ethics and Epicurean ethics as being positive and negative counterparts on the horizontal axis, the one dealing with more actual materialistic considerations than the less tangible or more virtual ones of the other.

Go to top

CONCLUSION

We have by these short examples only briefly delineated a systematic structural approach to ethics, but we propose that however rudimentary or fragmentary our demonstration might appear, we have searched in vain for any other methodology applied to ethics which has even done as much. After this introductory paper, we shall attempt at our next Conference to approach our subject in greater detail and with specific reference to other more ancient sources where the structural nature of the subject is perhaps more clearly evident.

Go to top

REFERENCES

1. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, (Tr.) R. A. Audra & C. Brereton, New York; Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, c. 1935. p. 20.

2. ibid. p. 32.

3. ibid. p. 41.

4. Ibid, p. 43.

5. Ibid, p. 46.

6. ibid. p. 73.

7. ibid. p. 76.

8. Narayana Guru, Atmopadesa Satakam, translation and commentary by Nataraja Guru, Gurukula Publishing House 1969, p.110.

9. Lao Tze, Tao Te King, Taiwan Press, Formosa, 1968

10. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, quoted in Introduction to Philosophy, Ed. Smullyan Prentice Hall, 1967, p. p. 243 et seq

11-13. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan London 1949 p. p. 18 et seq.

Go to top